Gonzalo Pineda’s under fire — what needs to change tactically?

After Atlanta United’s 2-1 loss to FC Cincinnati, the discourse surrounding Gonzalo Pineda’s job security has grown loud.

There have always been those that questioned if Pineda is the right man for the job, but more seem to question him now after the last few matches. There have been blowouts and tough losses before, but it took a few tight, winnable games against the league’s best to raise questions as United should be one of the league’s best on paper. Fans are wondering if Pineda can deliver the results needed now that he has a much more talented roster than the one he inherited in 2021. With only 11 points in the first 8 games, it’s not looking likely.

Most of the bad results come down to certain tactical changes and the misuse of certain players, so we’re breaking down what Pineda has done to put himself in his current position and what he can do to fix it.

Level midfield shape and positioning

For most of his time in Atlanta, Pineda’s go-to tactical setup in most situations of play is to have both the No. 6 and No. 8 even with each other instead of one midfielder dropped behind the other (6 behind the 8). On the positive, it’s usually beneficial when switching play. However, the majority of the time this shape is awful, and it’s because Atlanta’s midfielders stay level when they advance the ball.

Stepping too high with both midfielders level leaves a lot of space for an opponent’s No. 10 to exploit when Atlanta turns it over and leaves no cover if one of the midfielders loses the ball. This is why Atlanta United are so vulnerable to the counter attack. And, as seen in the Cincinnati game multiple times and many other times this season, Bartosz Slisz and Tristan Muyumba going up so high together isolates Atlanta’s backline, a backline which struggles to defend against the counter and on the backpedal without Stian Gregersen. They are forced to retreat while the opponent has plenty of free space centrally to run at them. This scenario can also happen when Atlanta’s high press is too aggressive with both midfielders.

An easy fix to this is by letting Slisz sit slightly behind Muyumba so that he can either cover the opponent’s No. 10 or cover space centrally in front of Atlanta’s center backs so that there is both less space to run into for opponents and easier for Atlanta’s fullbacks to close down attackers out wide because of the extra cover behind them. Dropping back also allows Slisz to provide cover if Muyumba loses the ball in the final third. He doesn’t have to drop back far, but by just fulfilling the normal role of a No. 6, Atlanta’s Achilles heel begins to heal.

Another positive of Slisz dropping in is that if the ball has to be played backwards, it goes to Slisz, who is still in the final third, rather than all the way to the backline, meaning Atlanta can more quickly go back to goal. When Slisz receives the ball, he is in a great position to swing the ball wide, which he has done before with Lennon, and make Atlanta more dangerous on the attack.

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Struggles building out of the back when trailing

When Atlanta is behind in a match, Pineda sends players very high and starts sending passes long. What he does is he pushes Brooks Lennon high to be level with the forwards so that there is a straight line of 4 attackers, but then he also pushes two midfielders high (not necessarily level), leaving whoever is dropping back and bringing the ball forward (Thiago Almada or Jay Fortune) completely isolated and dealing with pressure.

Instead of a quick buildup, Atlanta are forced to boot it long every time to a line of attackers that are both too spaced out to pick up a potential rebound from a header or a bad controlling touch by either team and too spread out to combine easily once the ball is won. If Pineda simply enforces his usual style at a quicker pace, Atlanta would have a better chance to get a result.

And yes, Atlanta has been able to scrap a point or victory from the jaws of defeat before, but some of these results are due to set-piece brilliance or set pieces won by the lone midfielder dropped back (Almada) who’s forcing the ball forward on the dribble so that he doesn’t have to boot it long, going against what Pineda designs the late-game system for.

It also doesn’t work well because of — once again — Atlanta’s level midfield pushed high. When Almada gets forward, he looks centrally, combining with the two high midfielders sitting on the 18. But, with the other team sitting back, they can usually only play backwards in a 1-2. If Atlanta played their normal style of play, they’d get it wide almost every time, which is a much better way to attack a team that’s bunkered in front of goal. They’d also be able to combine in the midfield and move the ball forward if only one of Slisz or Muyumba didn’t sit on the 18.

There’s no reason for this change in style of play until the last few minutes of the match, but Pineda does it too early and hasn’t used the simple fixes he already tactically planned for the rest of the match in the late game.

Poor utilization of substitutes

If any critique has been lauded on Pineda over his tenure at Atlanta United, it’s how he uses his substitutes, specifically how long he takes to even put them into the match. When the team has had momentum turn for the worst or are struggling away from home, he waits 70+ minutes to make a decision on who he wants to bring on to change the game.

When he does sub players in, his choices are usually poor. For example, vs. Cincinnati, he subbed in Fortune for Muyumba, completely killing the flow of Atlanta’s attack and ruining any chances at a comeback (also because he misused Fortune and forced it long). Against Columbus away, Cincinnati, and other matches, he’s subbed on Tyler Wolff for Xanda Silva and Saba Lobjanidze, respectively, taking out the game’s best chance creators when in a losing position for one of Atlanta’s weaker depth pieces. Another example that I’d rather forget is playing Derrick Etienne as an attacking midfielder.

The main reason for Pineda’s poor substitution choices is how he wants his subs to play when on the pitch. Fans may believe that Atlanta’s bench depth isn’t the best when compared to that of other MLS contenders (a topic for a different time), but Pineda’s role of a coach is to get the best out of the players under him. So far, he hasn’t done that.

Let’s take Fortune for example, a defensive midfielder (No. 6) that plays more like a No. 8. Fortune excels at connecting forward passes from defense to attack and being a smart defender, especially on the edge of the 18. Pineda wants to use him in an Almada role, dropping back and collecting the ball and going from a facilitator to a playmaker. That just doesn’t work with Fortune’s style of play.

Another example is, again, Wolff, a player who is best when supporting give-and-go passing and for finishing chances that fall to him, yet Pineda wants him to be an electric facilitator and playmaker that transforms games. Pineda is expecting too much out of his players and making bad tactical decisions because of it. Along with his bad timing of subs, he has to quickly learn to better manage late-game situations if he wants to keep his job.

There are more tactical issues we could get into, including tucking in his fullbacks to an extreme extent, fluctuation with the intensity of Atlanta’s high press, the lack of intensity of the team for an extended period of time from kickoff, and the tactical changes that result in an inability to gain results on the road. That’s not to say there aren’t positives in Pineda’s system, including the use of wingbacks in the attack creating an overload of crossing opportunities, hold-up play from the striker to combine with the midfield, patient buildup in the backline that plays through pressure, long switches of play, and the ability to create on the counter attack.

In his contract year, Pineda has utilized tactics that are proven to bring Atlanta United success, yet he continues to hold onto other ideas of his that fail time and time again. If he wants his contract to be renewed, he’s going to have to let go of his desire to stick with his system at almost all times and make changes for the betterment of the team’s success. If he doesn’t, the fact that he is an incredibly nice individual and worked wonders in the locker room may not be enough to save his job.