How Gonzalo Pineda’s tactics helped, hindered Atlanta United vs. Chicago Fire

While a 0-0 draw is never fun for fans, players, or coaches, they are one of the best games to analyze from a tactical standpoint. When both teams cannot score, both have prepared to defend the other well and/or cannot efficiently create goal-scoring opportunities. In that scenario, when there are no goals and mostly possessional play, it becomes quite clear why things are not coming to fruition on the pitch.

Atlanta United’s latest match played out the same way, so let’s see how Gonzalo Pineda’s tactics both helped and hurt his team in the 0-0 draw versus the Chicago Fire.

Positives

Formation in the final third. In our last tactical analysis, we discussed how Bartosz Slisz needed to drop behind Tristan Muyumba and not stay level with him in the final third, as staying level made Atlanta vulnerable to the counter attack when Muyumba lost the ball with no cover behind him and because there was so much space between Atlanta’s midfield and backline.

Well, Pineda did allow Slisz to sit back behind Muyumba, and it worked very well. Atlanta didn’t have to deal with a Chicago counter for most of the night and Slisz adequately defended the space in front of the backline, limiting passes forward on the break.

Also, Slisz dropping back helped Atlanta with moving the ball from side to side to get a cross in out wide. In the past, the team had to play a ball back all the way to a central defender if they couldn’t get it forward. Against the Fire, they only needed to play in Slisz and he’d quickly play a high wingback like Brooks Lennon or a winger, stopping a reset of the attack.

Considering how slow Atlanta has been building out of the back, keeping the ball high and staying on the attack even when you can’t immediately create a goal-scoring opportunity is very important, keeping consistent pressure on the defense. All in all, this was the perfect change from Pineda that Atlanta’s attack desperately needed.

Combination play with tucked-in wingers. While Atlanta game plan usually relies on wingers being close to the touchline to receive and cross the ball, playing with wingers tucked in actually helped them at certain moments in the match.

For example, when Chicago loaded numbers behind the ball, Thiago Almada looked for gaps in their defense by combining for 1-2s with either Tyler Wolff or Edwin Mosquera. Most of these plays didn’t work out as planned because the return pass to Almada was overhit, but some did and showed the potential of this combination.

Tucked-in wingers would also combine with Almada by passing back to him when he was just outside the corner of the 18. The most notable time was when Mosquera played Almada in the second half, leading to a pinpoint cross to Daniel Rios that should have been a goal if not for Chicago goalkeeper Chris Brady’s reaction save. Playing back to Almada when he is in what Pineda would dub a “primary-assist zone” allows for another way to overload the box with crosses other than wide and near the end line. However, if you wanted to get a cross in near the end line, the tucked in wingers could play through overlapping wingbacks.

Obviously, this idea shouldn’t be used at all times and the wingers should usually stay wide. But, if in need of a quick cross or a goal late in the game, this tactic works very well.

Negatives

Setup building out of the back. This is Atlanta’s major glaring issue, and it’s because Pineda tries to build out of the back with two different systems.

The first is by dropping one midfielder deep while pushing the others high. In this system, it’s hoped that Almada or the 6 can turn and quickly play a ball forward. However, teams counter this by sending a line of midfielders to step at Almada, cutting off a higher pass in the midfield and forcing Atlanta’s 10 to pass it wide. Then, if they commit numbers to cut off passing options down the line and back in the midfield, they win the ball or force Atlanta backward.

The second system is by bringing both the 6 and 8 back level with each other but leaving the 10 high. Once again, Atlanta is forced to play the ball wide against a high press because they don’t have adequate passing options forward, only to the side. When the ball goes wide, there is only one passing option back into the midfield because the two midfielders closest are level. The other is so high he can’t be a reasonable option. If the ball is played to the checking midfielder and they switch it to their level partner who plays it wide, they’re stuck in the same situation versus a committed press on the other side of the pitch. In summary, for both buildups, there’s no way forward unless the press is slow and/or not compact.

How can Pineda fix this? First, he needs to reduce the gap between the deepest and highest midfielder so that passing options forward are closer to whoever’s bringing the ball up. While the 10 drops back slightly, you have the 8 slightly behind him but also slightly ahead of the 6. No one is level, but no one is too far apart. Then, each midfielder can move into channels between the opponent’s midfielders and make it easier to move the ball forward from the 6. For a visual, picture Atlanta’s setup in the final third versus Chicago (Slisz, Muyumba higher, then Almada the highest) but with Muyumba and Almada dropping slightly more.

Want to move it forward from out wide? This change helps, too. With the 6, 8, and 10 evenly spread out, any of them could step into space between defenders depending on the situation. At any time, at least two could show for Atlanta’s wingback or winger rather than only one. Just like in the final third when Muyumba and Almada combine with Saba Lobjanidze or Lennon with 1-2s, they can do this building out of the back, too.

If Atlanta United can use formational set-ups similar to those in the final third while building out of the back, they’ll be able to beat the high press and have less pressure once the ball is in the final third. Less pressure leads to a more efficient attack with easier scoring opportunities, showing that maybe fixing one problem can help the team as a whole.

Refusing to switch play. Atlanta have been known in the past for switching the ball forward and across the field to wingers from Almada when he drops back. They’ve also been known to switch the play long from their center backs. But now, that’s rarely used as the pressing efforts from opponents against Atlanta have improved, specifically not giving Almada or the center backs enough time on the ball to find the passing option for a switch. If Atlanta can speed up both their decision making before the switch and while executing it, they’ll have an easier time beating the press (by going over it) and starting their attack.

Another glaring issue Atlanta had against Chicago was switching the play in the final third, especially toward Lobjanidze. It was extremely frustrating how often he was left wide open near or inside the 18-yard box, yet no one would play it to him. While combination play out wide is good in creating a crossing or goal-scoring opportunity, it’s easier to drop the ball backward and switch it to a wide-open man when the opportunity comes than to force play down one side of the final third.

As Atlanta United gets ready to play Minnesota United this weekend, they need to look at what worked and didn’t work in Chicago to start gaining the results they need. Ninth place in the East is simply not good enough at this stage in the season. Pineda needs to be open to changing some of his tactics for the betterment of the team, and there’s proof that he’s slowly started to do that with the midfield setup in the final third. He simply needs to keep being aware of his mistakes and learn from them.

However, none of these tactics matter if Atlanta don’t play with passion and intensity under Pineda. As a coach, you cannot force your players to work hard, but you can inspire them to work hard. I’d argue that Atlanta’s biggest Achilles heel this entire season has not been a tactical issue but instead their overall pace of play, especially their slow starts that last for at least the first 25 minutes of a match.

If Pineda wants to keep his job, he needs to fix the tactics and the pace. If you’ve truly fixed the locker room, inspire the locker room. Then, hopefully, the fans will be inspired by Atlanta United again.